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NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION
EXCEPTION TO THE FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS ACT:
HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?
David Childers, along with his parents and his brother and
sister, went to Yellowstone National Park to hike one winter after-
noon.' As an exuberant 11 year old child,2 David ran ahead of his
parents.' The government safety manual provided that if roads
and trails could not be maintained as designed and built, they
would either be closed or the public adequately warned.4 There-
fore, the Childers assumed the trails they hiked upon that day
were safe.5 But, when David fell to his death that day in Yellow-
stone, the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA)6 protected the decisions made by the National
Park Service as to the precise manner in which to warn the public
as to the trails left open, but unmaintained, in the winter.7 The
Childers' suit was therefore dismissed without any recovery for
the loss of their son."
The purpose of the FTCA is to waive sovereign immunity so
that private citizens can sue the United States Government for
1. Childers v. United States, 40 F.3d 973 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding the
discretionary function exception to the FTCA protected the decisions of the
National Park Service relating to the treatment of unmaintained trails in the
park, resulting in the case being dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 976.
5. Id. at 976.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1996).
7. Childers, 40 F.3d at 976.
8. Id.
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the torts its employees commit in the scope of their employment. 9
This waiver of immunity is subject to 13 specific exceptions. The
primary exception is the discretionary function exception which
provides, in pertinent part, that the United States is not liable for
any claim "based upon the exercise or performance or the failure
to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part
of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or
not the discretion involved be abused."10
The current state of the discretionary function exception is
unsatisfactory. Courts have applied the exception on an ad hoc
basis without any precise test. Such an application leaves liti-
gants unable to predict the outcome of their case. Under current
application, the discretionary function exception reaches too
broadly. The purpose of the discretionary function exception
would better be served by making a threshold inquiry as to
whether the challenged action involved a uniquely governmental
function. If no unique governmental function exists, the discre-
tionary function exception should not be applicable.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE FTCA
Before adoption of the FTCA, members of the general public
could not sue the federal government for negligent acts committed
by government agents or officials. The common-law tradition of
sovereign immunity prevented a citizen's suit regardless of its
merits, reflecting the maxim that "the king could do no wrong." "
The only opportunity for relief pre-FTCA involved filing a
request for compensatory relief through a private congressional
claim bill. However, the administration of these claims became
onerous and overwhelming.' 2 The Seventy-ninth Congress intro-
duced the FTCA in 194611 in an attempt to provide a more man-
9. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1996). The jurisdictional grant of power to the
federal courts to decide FTCA cases appears at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1996).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1996).
11. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 200
(1976). See generally, 1 W. BLACKSTONE, Commentaries 238-39.
12. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 25 n.9 (1953) (which discussed
the clumsy operation of the private claim bill procedure). For example, in the
Seventieth Congress (1937), 2,268 private claim bills were introduced, totaling
more than $100 million in damages. Of those claim bills, 362 were enacted with
144 in tort for a total of $562,000.
13. Title IV of the Legislative Reorganization. Act, ch. 753, §§ 401-424, 60
Stat. 842 (1946) (current version at 28 U.S.C. 2671-2680).
412 [Vol. 19:411
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ageable solution. The FTCA generally authorizes suits against
the United States for damages:
for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by
the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employ-
ment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law
of the place where the act or omission occurred. 14
The FTCA imposes liability on the United States for acts of its
employees "in the same manner and to the same extent as a pri-
vate individual under like circumstances." 15 The FTCA generally
allows suits for negligently inflicted injuries, but bars suits for
most intentional torts. 16 The FTCA provides thirteen specific
exemptions to Government liability.' 7 These exceptions act as
jurisdictional bars to a suit. When an exception applies, there is
no waiver of sovereign immunity and the claim will be dismissed
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The primary exception, the discretionary function exception,
provides that no liability shall lie for:
[any claim based upon the act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or
regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise
or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the dis-
cretion involved be abused.'
The exception has two parts: (1) due care and (2) discretion-
ary function. The due care prong is straight-forward. The control-
ling inquiry is whether the employee used due care in
implementing or applying a statute or regulation.' 9 Then, if the
employee is subject to a specific statute or regulation, a typical
negligence analysis would be conducted. Either the statute or reg-
ulation would set the applicable standard of care or, if not, the
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1996).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1996).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1996).
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1996).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1996).
19. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 328 (1991) (stating that the first
inquiry is "whether the challenged actions were discretionary, or whether they
were instead controlled by mandatory statutes or regulations.").
1997] 413
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standard would be an objective inquiry of whether the employee
used due care (was non-negligent) in applying the statute.20
The discretionary function prong is more ambiguous. The
FTCA does not contain a definition of a "discretionary function."
Since the FTCA's adoption, courts have struggled over the mean-
ing and breadth of the discretionary function exception. In 1953,
the United States Supreme Court, in Dalehite v. United States,
broadly interpreted the exception and the meaning of "discretion-
ary" as "acts of a governmental nature or function."21
II. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
Dalehite v. United States was a consolidated action against
the United States for damages arising from an explosion of ammo-
nium nitrate fertilizer being stored in Texas Harbor.22 This was a
test case, "representing some 300 separate personal and property
claims in the aggregate amount of two hundred million dollars."23
Claimamts fled suit under the FTCA24 claiming negligence on the
part of the entire body of federal officials and employees involved
in the production of the Fertilizer Grade Ammonium Nitrate
(FGAN).25 The FGAN "had been produced and distributed at the
instance, according to the specifications and under the control of
the United States."26
FGAN's basic ingredient was ammonium nitrate, a highly vol-
atile and fulminating compound, long used as a component in
explosives.27 However it was chosen because ammonium nitrate
functioned as a good fertilizer as well, due to its high free nitrogen
content.28 By April 15, 1947, following three weeks of storage,
over 2,850 tons of FGAN were loaded onto two different cargo
ships docked in Texas Harbor.29 One of the ships carried an addi-
tional substantial cargo of explosives and the other over 2,000
tons of sulphur.30
20. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955).
21. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 28 (1953).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 17.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 18.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 21.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 22.
30. Id. at 22-23.
414 [Vol. 19:411
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Early the next morning, smoke was sighted in the hold of one
of the ships. 1 The captain of the ship ordered all personnel off
and the hatches closed. 2 Steam was introduced into the holds,
which was the normal fire-fighting procedure aboard ships. 33
However, due to the oxidizing properties of FGAN, this introduc-
tion of steam actually aggravated matters.34 All efforts to control
the fire failed and both ships exploded. 5 The explosion leveled
much of the city and caused many deaths and injuries.3 6 The peti-
tioners charged the United States with bringing the catastrophe
upon itself by shipping the FGAN, known to be explosive, to a con-
gested area without warning of the possibility of explosion under
certain conditions.37
The Court began with an analysis of the historical precedent
of the FTCA.38 The general principle is that no action lies against
the United States unless the legislature has authorized it. 3 9 The
FTCA makes the United States liable "as a private citizen under
like circumstances."40 The Supreme Court's prior decisions had
"interpreted the Act to require clear relinquishment of sovereign
immunity to give jurisdiction for tort actions." 41 The United
States Government argued the discretionary function exception
barred all claims. Before applying the discretionary function
exception, the Court looked to the Congressional Committee hear-
ings for guidance.42
It was not intended that the constitutionality of legislation,
the legality of regulations, or the propriety of a discretionary
administrative act should be tested through the medium of a dam-
age suit for tort. The same holds true of other administrative
31. Id. at 23.
32. Id. at 23 n.7.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 23.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 24.
39. Id. at 30 (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950).
40. 28 U.S.C. §2674 (1996).
41. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 31. See also, United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535,
538 (1980) (citing United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969)).
42. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 26.
1997] 415
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action not of a regulatory nature, such as the expenditure of Fed-
eral Funds, the execution of a Federal project and the like.43
The Court found that while Congress decided to waive the
Government's immunity from actions for injuries to person and
property arising from tortious conduct, "it was not contemplated
that the Government should be subject to liability arising from
acts of a governmental nature or function." 4 Although § 2680(a)
precludes suits against the Government growing out of authorized
activity, it was not intended to be a means "to test the validity of
or provide a remedy on account of such" governmental discretion-
ary decision-making, even though negligently performed. 45 The
Court stated "[olne need only read [§1 2680 in its entirety to con-
clude that Congress exercised care to protect the Government
from claims, however negligently caused, that affected the govern-
mental functions."46 The discretionary function exception covers
all employees exercising discretion, including both negligence and
wrongful acts. 47 The FTCA did not intend to relieve the Govern-
ment from liability for such common-law torts as a car wreck
caused by the negligence of an employee. The discretion protected
by the section is that of an "executive or ... administrator to act
according to one's judgment of the best course."48  The Court
determined "discretion" to be "room for policy judgment and deci-
sion."49 The Court did not make a distinction between the execu-
tives or administrators who make the policy and the subordinates
who carry out the operations of government 5° It follows that both
executives and subordinates could be covered under the discre-
tionary function exception. 5'
43. Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 25, 33 (1952). See Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 27 n.15.
44. Dalehite , 346 U.S. at, 28 (emphasis added). See also H.R. Rep. No. 2800,
71st Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1929); Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess., 28, 33, 38, 45, 65-66 (1942); S. Rep.No. 1196, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess., 7; H.R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1946); 86 Cong. Rec. 12021-
12022 (1959).
45. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 30.
46. Id. at 32.
47. Id. at 33.
48. Id. at 34.
49. Id. at 36.
50. Id.
51. As will be discussed, the next Supreme Court decision that discussed the
discretionary function exception, Indian Towing Company v. United States, 350
U.S. 61 (1955), made a distinction between operational and planning levels using
Dalehite as precedence for making the distinction. However, the Dalehite Court
[Vol. 19:411416
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The Court first applied the discretionary function exception to
the cabinet-level decision to initiate the fertilizer export program
and found that it was clearly a discretionary act.52 Clearly, such
matters of governmental discretion were excepted from the
FTCA.53 The Court then turned to the specific acts of negligence
alleged to have occurred at Texas Harbor.54 The District Court
had found four specific acts of negligence in the manufacture of
the FGAN: 1) temperature; 2) type of container; 3) type of label-
ing; and 4) paraffin coating.55 However, the Court found these
alleged acts of negligence were a result of discretionary act made
at a planning level and involved considerations important to the
practicability of the FGAN program.56
The evidence, as a whole, showed that FGAN could be han-
dled safely in the manner it was handled in Texas Harbor.57 The
ignition that led to this disaster was a "complex result of the inter-
acting factors" and truly just an unfortunate accident.5 Thus, the
acts of the Government in formulating a plan for manufacture of
the FGAN and in carrying it out, were, under the circumstances,
acts of discretion and could not result in liability.59 The federal
government could rest easy after Dalehite, relying on its broad
interpretation of "discretionary."
That rest did not last long. In 1955, the Court introduced a
new test to determine whether a government act was "discretion-
ary." In Indian Towing Co. v. United States, the Court fashioned
a test based upon a distinction between operational and planning
levels of government.6 0
specifically rejected this distinction. Discretion includes determinations made by
administrators and "[iut necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in carrying
out the operations of government in accordance with official directions cannot be
actionable." Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 36.
52. Id. at 37.
53. Id. at 38.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 39-40.
56. Id. at 42. It was with here that the "operational vs. planning" distinction
was hatched. The Indian Towing Court gave more weight than was due to the
phrase "[tihe decisions held culpable were all responsibly made at a planning
rather than operational level." Id. The Dalehite Court merely made the
distinction to emphasize the policy considerations that had to be made regarding
the FGAN.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
1997] 417
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The petitioners sought recovery under the FTCA for damages
alleged to have been caused by the negligent operation of a light-
house light." A tugboat, owned by the petitioner, was towing a
barge when it went aground due to an inoperative lighthouse
opened and operated by the United States Coast Guard.6 2 Specifi-
cally, the petitioners alleged the Coast Guard was negligent in
checking the system which operated the light, failing to properly
check the connections, failing to repair, and failing to give warn-
ing that the light was not operating.6 3 The Court determined the
question to be "one of liability for negligence at what this Court
has characterized the 'operational level' of government activity."64
The Coast Guard was not required to provide light house ser-
vice, but once the discretionary decision was made to operate a
light house, the Coast Guard was obligated to use due care to keep
the light in good working order.6 5 The discretionary decision was
made in deciding to operate the lighthouse. The conduct of the
Coast Guard thereafter, in the Court's eyes, did not involve any
discretionary judgment. 66 The Court relied on Dalehite to distin-
guish between levels of conduct. There would be no liability for
acts occurring during the "planning" level because that was where
the discretionary policy judgment was made. In turn, there would
be liability for acts taken during the "operational" level because no
policy judgment was involved.
The Court's reliance on the planning/operational distinction
served to bar suits implicating government functions at the plan-
ning stage, but allowed suits implicating government functions at
the operational stage.67 Over the next thirty years, lower courts
adopted and applied this operational/planning test.68
61. Id. at 62.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 64.
65. Id. at 69.
66. Id. at 64.
67. Id. at 64-69.
68. See Harold J. Krent, Preserving Discretion Without Sacrificing Deterrence:
Federal Governmental Liability in Tort, 38 UCLA L. REV. 871, 880 (1991) (noting
the adoption of the operational/planning test in various forms by lower courts);
Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., The Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal
Tort Claims Act: Time for Reconsideration, 42 OKLA. L. REV. 459, 461 (1989)
(observing the operational/planning test became a standard practice in
application).
418 [Vol. 19:411
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In United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio
Grandens,69 the Court departed from the operational/planning
distinction and adopted a new test that would focus "on the nature
of the conduct rather than the status of the actor."70 The specific
circumstances of Varig Airlines were particularly conducive to
this new test.
The Federal Aviation Act of 195871 directs the Secretary of
Transportation to promote the safety of civil aircraft by establish-
ing minimum standards for aircraft design, materials, workman-
ship, construction, and performance. Appropriately, the Secretary
has discretion to define the rules and regulations governing the
inspection of aircraft before they receive their Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) compliance certificates.72 The FAA, as the
Secretary's designee, 73 promulgated a comprehensive set of mini-
mum safety standards which the manufacturers of aircraft must
comply before marketing their products. 4 Thus, the Secretary's
discretionary decision was to make the manufacturers comply
with the minimum safety standards and enforce their compliance
through review of a particular manufacturer's data by conducting
"spot-check" of manufacturers' work.75
In 1973, a commercial airplane owned by Varig Airlines
crashed due to a fire that broke out in one of the aft lavatories.76
The fire filled the cabin and cockpit with smoke, and 124 of the
135 persons on board died of asphyxiation.7 7 The aircraft was a
Boeing 707 which received its certification in 1958 from the Civil
Aeronautics Agency (CAA), a predecessor of the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), thus certifying that the aircraft's designs,
plans, specifications, and performance data were in conformity
with minimum safety standards. 71 Varig Airlines pointed to regu-
lation 14 CFR § 4b.381(d) (1956), 7 9 which required that trash cans
be made of fire-resistant materials and incorporate covers or other
69. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
70. United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig
Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 813 (1984).
71. 49 U.S.C. § 1421 (a)(1) (1988).
72. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 804.
73. See Pub.L. 89-670, § 6(c)(1), 80 Stat. 938 (1965).
74. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 805.
75. Id. at 817.
76. Id. at 799-800.
77. Id. at 800.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 801
1997] 419
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provisions for containing possible fires.8 0 Thus, the CAA was neg-
ligent when it inspected the Boeing 707 and issued a certification
when the trash cans in the aft lavatory did not comply with the
minimum fire protection standards.8 1
Varig Airline's action was consolidated with a separate action
by John Dowdle, who purchased a DeHavialland Dove airplane
that had been issued a certification from the FAA but crashed due
to an in-flight fire in the forward baggage compartment of the air-
craft.8 ' The cause of the fire was a gasoline-burning cabin heater
installed in the airplane which did not comply with the applicable
FAA regulations, much like the trash cans in Varig Airlines' air-
plane. 8 There was no evidence that either the Boeing 707 trash
can or the DeHavilland Dove cabin heater was actually inspected
or reviewed by an FAA inspector. The respondents argued a negli-
gent failure to inspect as well as negligence in the implementation
of "spot-check" system for preserving air transportation safety.8 4
The Court concluded that these allegedly negligent acts were
governmental duties protected by the discretionary function
exception and thus the action was barred.8 5 The Court set a new
standard for applying the discretionary function exception. The
Court held "[first, it is the nature of the conduct rather than the
status of the actor, that governs whether the discretionary func-
tion exception applies in a given case.""' The Varig court, upon re-
reading Dalehite, agreed the exception covers all employees exer-
cising discretion and not just the administrators or agencies of the
government.8 7 The first prong of the new test became "whether
the challenged acts of a Government employee-whatever his or
her rank- are of the nature and quality that Congress intended
to shield from tort liability."8 The second prong was whether the
discretionary act was grounded in social, economic, or political pol-
icy, and was therefore protected by the discretionary function
exception in order to prevent judicial "second-guessing" of legisla-
tive and administrative decisions.8 9
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 802.
83. Id. at 803.
84. Id. at 819.
85. Id. at 821.
86. Id. at 813.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 814.
420 [Vol. 19:411
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When this new test was applied, the Court found the compli-
ance reviews involved policy judgments regarding the degree of
confidence in the particular manufacturer, the need to maximize
compliance with the FAA regulations, and the efficient allocation
of agency resources.90 The risks associated with the "spot-check"
program were encountered in the "advancement of a governmen-
tal purpose and pursuant to a specific grant of authority in the
regulations and operating manuals."91 The Court stated "[t]he
FAA has a statutory duty to promote safety in air transportation,
not to insure it."92 In Indian Towing, the Court held once a gov-
ernmental agency undertook an activity it had a duty to use due
care. 93 But after Varig, once a governmental agency undertook an
activity, if its actions involve any judgment in social, economic, or
political policy, there is no resulting duty to use due care and the
discretionary function exception bars the claim.
The Court confirmed the Varig Airlines analysis in Berkovitz
v. United States.94 In Berkovitz, a two-month old infant was given
a polio vaccine manufactured by Lederle Laboratories, a civilian
laboratory licensed to produce the vaccine by the Division of Bio-
logic Standards (DBS).95 The infant contracted a severe case of
polio and was left almost completely paralyzed. 96 The parents
sued under the FTCA for the negligent licensing of Lederle to pro-
duce the vaccine and also for the negligent approval of release by
the Bureau of Biologics of the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) of the particular lot of vaccine received by the infant.9 7
The Court reiterated Varig Airlines stating "it is the nature of
the conduct, rather than the status of the actor, that governs
whether the discretionary function exception applies in a given
case."98 The Court restated the determinative test for whether
the challenged conduct is discretionary. The first prong of the test
is "whether the action is a matter of choice for the acting
employee."99 This inquiry separates the "due care" part from the
"discretionary function" part of the discretionary function excep-
90. Id. at 820.
91. Id. at 820.
92. Id. at 821.
93. Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 69.
94. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988).
95. Id. at 533.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813.
99. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536.
1997]
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tion. As discussed earlier, if an employee has no choice but to fol-
low a statute or regulation, he must do so with "due care." If the
regulation mandates a specific course of conduct, the employee
has no other option but to follow the rules. The employee's con-
duct cannot be the product of any discretion because he is not
given any independent judgment. As the Berkovitz Court stated,
"conduct cannot be discretionary unless it involves an element of
judgment or choice." 1° °
The second prong of the test requires a court to -determine
"assuming the challenged conduct involves an element of judg-
ment.., whether that judgment is of the kind that the discretion-
ary function exception was designed to shield."10 The Court
emphasized the need to "prevent judicial 'second-guessing' of leg-
islative and administrative decisions."102 The Court stressed
"[t]he exception, properly construed, therefore protects only gov-
ernmental actions and decisions based on considerations of public
policy." 10 3
As applied in Berkovitz, the discretionary function exception
did not bar the cause of action.10 4 The DBS is required to comply
with statutory and regulatory provisions provided in the Public
Health Service Act (PHSA).' 0 5 The petitioners alleged the DBS
issued a product license to Lederle Labs in violation of the PHSA,
and thus disobeyed a specific statutory directive. 10 6 Petitioners
further alleged the DBS stepped outside the discretionary func-
tion exception when it failed to follow the directive. They argued
"[t]he agency ha[d] no discretion to deviate from th[e] mandated
procedure."'0 7 With respect to the allegation of negligence by the
Bureau of Biologics of the FDA, the discretionary function excep-
tion applied to the agency's decision in formulating a policy as to
the appropriate way in which to regulate the releases of vaccine
lots.108 The Court posited three factual bases for the plaintiff's
claim: 1) the Bureau had issued the license without making any
100. Id. See Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 34 (stating that the exception covered "the
discretion of the executive or the administrator to act according to one's
judgment of the best course.").
101. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536.
102. Id. at 536-537 (quoting Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814).
103. Id. at 537.
104. Id. at 542.
105. Id. at 541. See 42 U.S.C. §262(d) (1996).
106. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 542.
107. Id. at 544.
108. Id. at 546.
422 [Vol. 19:411
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finding regarding compliance, 2) the Bureau had determined the
vaccine was not in compliance but had issued the license anyway,
and 3) the Bureau had determined that the vaccine was in compli-
ance but that its determination was wrong.10 9 If the plaintiffs
claim was based on either of the first two theories, the discretion-
ary function exception would not apply because each involved the
violation of a clear statutory duty.'10 Because the Bureau's policy
mandated a specific course of action, or left no room for policy
judgment, the discretionary function exception would not bar a
claim."' The third theory, however, "hinges on whether the
agency officials making that determination permissibly exer-
cise[d] policy choice,"" 2 If so, the Court held the discretionary
function applies and the suit is barred." 3 If the determination is
made by the mere "application of objective scientific standards," a
plaintiffs claim is not barred." 14
The Court found the Bureau's policy did mandate a specific
course of action and adopted a policy to test all lots for compliance
with safety standards and to prevent public distribution of any lot
that does not comply." 5 Thus, the government's motion to dis-
miss was denied and the case was remanded." 6
Although the Court did not utilize the discretionary function,
the Court's Berkovitz test reaches as broadly, if not more so than
their Dalehite decision. After Berkovitz, a court cannot evaluate
government decisions for tort liability in matters grounded in
social, economic, or political policy. Discretionary immunity,
therefore, will apply when the employee makes a decision involv-
ing a policy judgment. This application is not a test at all. It begs
the question, and leaves lower courts with the ability to make ad
hoc decisions based upon particular facts. The Court has used
terms that are more ambiguous than "discretionary" in formulat-
ing a definition for the word itself. After Berkovitz, an agency
directive must merely leave room for an official to exercise policy
judgment in performing a given act for the exception to apply.
Clearly this test is overbroad and too unpredictable in application.
109. Id. at 543.
110. Id. at 544.
111. Id. at 546-47.
112. Id. at 545.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 547.
116. Id. at 548.
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In Gaubert, the Court's latest visit with the discretionary
function exception, it officially rejected the operational/planning
distinction in Indian Towing in favor of Berkovitz's broader inter-
pretation of the discretionary function test.1 1 7 A shareholder of an
insolvent savings and loan association brought an action against
the United States under the FTCA. 118 Gaubert alleged negligent
supervision of directors and officers and negligent involvement in
the day-to-day operations by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB), who, pursuant to the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933,
undertook to advise and oversee aspects of operation of Gaubert's
savings association.'19
The Court made the primary inquiry as to whether the chal-
lenged actions were discretionary or controlled by directive. 120
There was no specific statute that governed the FHLBB's con-
duct, rather the agency had broad statutory authority to supervise
financial institutions.12 1 To that end, the Court found"[t]he rele-
vant statutory provisions were not mandatory, but left to the judg-
ment of the agency the decision of when to institute proceedings
against a financial institution and which mechanism to use."122
Further, the Court found the advice the FHLBB gave to Gaubert
regarding the operation of the savings and loan association was
"within the purview of the policies behind the statutes."23 There-
fore, the Court found the discretionary function applied, because
there was room for a policy judgment.
In addition, the Court created a presumption for barring
claims with the discretionary function by stating "if a regulation
mandates particular conduct, and the employee obeys the direc-
tion, the Government will be protected because the action will be
deemed in furtherance of the policies which led to the promulga-
tion of the regulation."124 The mere "existence of a regulation cre-
ates a strong presumption that the discretionary act ... involves
consideration of ... [public] policies."' 25
Justice Scalia concurred in the Gaubert judgment but wrote
separately because he realized the breadth of the exception under
117. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 315.
118. Id. at 318.
119. Id. at 318-20.
120. Id. at 328.
121. Id. at 329.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 333.
124. Id. at 324.
125. Id.
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the majority's test and felt it necessary to establish clearer guide-
lines for the discretionary function exception.12 6 He agreed with
the majority that an across the board distinction made at the oper-
ational/planning level is inappropriate.' 2 7 However, he believed
an appropriate test should look to the level at which the decision
was made because not only is it necessary for application of the
discretionary function exception that the decision maker be an
official who possesses the relevant policy responsibility, but also
the decision maker's close identification with policymaking can be
strong evidence that ... the subject matter of the decision is one
that ought to be more informed by policy considerations.
28
Since regulations themselves cannot be challenged under the
FTCA, it follows that all regulations that Congress did not intend
be subject to judicial intervention involve policy judgments.
The test proposed by Justice Scalia also contained "a similar
presumption, though not an absolute one, that decisions reserved
to policymaking levels involve such judgments-and the higher
the policymaking level, the stronger the presumption."' 29 Justice
Scalia's input is logical and follows the language of the FTCA
itself. In fact, the FTCA shall not apply to acts of a governmental
employee "exercising due care, in the execution of a statute
... whether or not such statute ... be valid." 30 It follows, if the
challenged action involves a policy judgment, and the employee is
authorized to exercise that judgment, then the discretionary func-
tion exception will apply regardless of the negligence involved in
the actual exercise of the judgment. Thus rightfully, "'action'
within the purview of the relevant policy is neither a necessary
nor a relevant sufficient condition for invoking the discretionary
function exception. " 13 1
Justice Scalia's recommendation helps define the necessary
degree of judgment for finding discretion. However the current
test when viewed in conjunction therewith still remains too broad.
Under current application, the discretionary function exception
protects all governmental actions and decisions as long as they
can be classified as decisions based on social, economic or political
policy considerations. The discretionary function exception over-
126. Id. at 335.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 336.
129. Id. at 337.
130. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1996).
131. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 338.
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takes the FTCA when the Berkovitz/Gaubert test is applied. An
inspection of recent Circuit Court decisions shows the lack of gui-
dance the Berkovitz/Gaubert discretion test provides. The over-
breadth of the exception becomes clear because in cases where the
discretionary choice does not involve a uniquely governmental
function and the exception is applied, the purpose of the Act is not
being served. Recent Circuit Court cases were selected that
seemed to epitomize the shortcomings of the current application of
the discretionary function exception. Due to the magnitude of
case law in the area, it is not implied that the few cases cited are
solely representative of the profusion of case law in each circuit.
III. CIRCUIT-BY-CIRCUIT ANALYSIS
In Irving v. United States, the First Circuit was faced with a
unusual situation.13 2 In 1979, Gail Irving was injured when her
hair got caught in an unguarded rotating shaft of a "die-out
machine" located near her work station.'3 3 In 1981, she filed a
claim under the FTCA alleging negligence on the part of the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in inspecting
and preventing the undisputed safety violation of the unguarded
rotating shaft. 34 The government made a motion to dismiss
under the discretionary function exception in February of 1982,
and the court denied the motion.'3 5 The Supreme Court's Varig
Airline decision was handed down in 1984, and the government
renewed its motion to dismiss at that time, but the district court
denied its second motion also.' 3 6 The bench trial on the merits
was concluded in February of 1985, however the district court
waited until January of 1988 to dismiss the suit without reaching
the merits.' 37 The district court reversed its earlier rulings and
concluded the discretionary function exception applied.' 38 On the
plaintiffs first appeal, the appellate court vacated the dismissal
and remanded the matter for further consideration in light of the
recent Berkovitz decision.' 3
9
132. Irving v. United States, 49 F.3d 830 (1st Cir. 1995).
133. Id. at 832.
134. Id.
135. Id. See 532 F. Supp. 840 (D.N.H. 1982), vacated and remanded, 49 F.3d
830 (1st Cir. 1995).
136. Irving, 49 F.3d at 832.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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The district court did not follow the Appellate Court's instruc-
tion. The district court did not discuss whether the challenged
action involved a matter of choice for the acting employee or
whether the challenged action involved a permissible exercise of
policy judgment. 140 Instead, the district court relied entirely on a
"post-Berkovitz OSHA case in which the Fifth Circuit had found
the discretionary function exception to apply, and ruled that the
suit was within the scope of the exception." 14 1 On the plaintiffs
second appeal, the appellate court agreed with the plaintiff's alle-
gation of specific OSHA safety violations, and the court vacated
and remanded for a second time. Thus "an issue of fact still lin-
ger[ed] in the record: whether OSHA policy left the thoroughness
of the inspections a matter of choice for its compliance officers."142
After this remand, the district court waited until June of 1994
to ignore the Circuit Court's instructions. The district court,
instead of answering the lingering fact question of discretion,
addressed the merits of the claim and found the "offending rotat-
ing shaft was permissibly 'guarded by location.'" 143 This finding of
guarded by location meant, at the time of the OSHA inspections,
the machine was in a different location, nearer to the wall. The
appellate court applied the clear-error standard of review and
once again vacated and remanded the judgment of the district
court.14 4 Nothing emphasizes the state of confusion in the lower
federal courts more than a trial being held over ten years after the
original trial, for injuries suffered fifteen years ago. The lower dis-
trict court obviously could not understand the Berkovitz/Gaubert
test as it applied to Miss Irving's case, otherwise it would have
followed the instructions given by the appellate court.
The Second Circuit in Lewis v. Babcock Industries, Inc., dis-
cussed the Military Contractor Defense to a products liability
claim. A pilot brought his claim against contractors, alleging a
defect in the cables necessary for a safe and effective evacuation
from a jet fighter. 145 The discretionary function exception resem-
bles the military contractor defense because both require "that a
government official had made the type of policy decision consid-
140. Id. at 833.
141. Id. See Galvin v. OSHA, 860 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1988).
142. Irving, 49 F.3d at 833 (quoting Irving I, 909 F.2d 598, 605 (1st Cir. 1990).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 835.
145. Lewis v. Babcock Indus., Inc., 985 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1993).
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ered a discretionary function under the [FTCA]."' 46 In this case,
the court found the necessary discretion because the government
did not "merely 'rubber stamp' [the] design," but rather played an
integral part in ordering and reviewing the test data on the spe-
cific cables. 147 Like the Berkovitz/Gaubert test, the fact that a
choice had to be made seems sufficient to satisfy the need for dis-
cretion, because such choice would presumptively be bound in pol-
icy considerations. 148
In Fisher Bros. Sales, Inc. v. United States, the Third Circuit
was faced with a twist on the discretionary function exception
when it was required to decide when a claim becomes "based on"
the exercise of a discretionary function.149 The Commissioner of
the FDA refused entry of Chilean grown fruit based on a labora-
tory report indicating the presence of cyanide in the produce. 50
The fruit growers and others claimed the laboratory report was
negligently prepared, violated procedures, and the Commissioner
was therefore negligent in relying upon it.' 5 '
The court reiterated the Supreme Court's BerkovitzlGaubert
test and found the "Commissioner's decisions both involved an ele-
ment of judgment or choice, and were the kind of choices 'that the
discretionary function exception was designed to shield.'"' 52 The
Commissioner, the court found, was required to evaluate and rec-
oncile conflicting findings, reports, and anonymous telephone
calls. 153 The Commissioner erred on the side of precaution and
the court found his decision protected by the discretionary func-
tion exception.
The plaintiffs made an additional charge and alleged their
complaint was "based on" the actions of the laboratory technicians
and not the decision of the Commissioner of the FDA.154 The
Commissioner would not have made his discretionary decision but
for the negligence of the laboratory technicians.155 The court
found the claim contrary to the purpose of the prevention of judi-
cial second-guessing. The court stated "every policy decision
146. Id. at 86.
147. Id. at 87.
148. Id.
149. Fisher Bros. Sales, Inc. v. United States, 46 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 1995).
150. Id. at 283.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 285 (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536).
153. Fisher Bros. Sales, Inc., 46 F.3d at 285.
154. Id. at 286.
155. Id.
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involves an exercise of the policymaker's judgment about the relia-
bility, adequacy, and significance of the information available to
him... and... no decision-maker can have one hundred percent
confidence in the information before him... at any given point in
time."15 6 The court held "the discretionary function exception was
intended to make sure every Commissioner's judgment will not be
skewed by" considerations involving possible litigation and liabil-
ity for each one of his decisions. 157 .
The court stated the purpose of the discretionary function
exception eloquently, but did not sufficiently address the plain-
tiffs' claim. As the dissent pointed out in analyzing the actions
taken here by the FDA, one must consider carefully whether it is
implicit in the order for tests to be performed that the tests are
both scientifically accepted and reliable. If it is implicit, I would
not extend the discretionary function exception to actions which
predictably follow from the test results. The discretionary func-
tion exception should not protect an official's decisions brought
about by the results of accepted and reliable tests, just as it will
not protect an official's release of a noncomplying lot of polio
vaccine. 158
The dissent likened the claim to that in Berkovitz, where the
DBS wrongfully licensed the production of polio vaccine because
"judgment guided purely by scientific or other objective principles
does not involve discretion for purposes of the discretionary func-
tion exception." 59 Thus, if the court were to adjudicate the com-
plaint, the court would not be second-guessing a policy-based
decision, but it would be "measuring the technicians' conduct
against the procedures they were to have followed and principles
of good laboratory practice." 60 The dissent further relied on the
"due care" prong of the discretionary function exception and stated
156. Id. at 287.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 289. The en banc argument brought a 7-6 decision in favor of
finding the discretionary function exception applied. The six dissenters found
the plaintiffs allegations satisfied the Berkovitz pleading requirements, while the
seven judges in the majority did not. Again this shows a clear confusion in the
lower courts regarding the application of the Berkovitz test.
159. Id. at 290. The dissent cited Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059 (3d
Cir. 1974) and Ayala v. United States, 980 F.2d 1342 (10th Cir. 1992) in support
of their proposition. Both of these decisions found the alleged discretionary
judgments were actually governed by objective scientific principles and therefore
could not be grounded in public policy.
160. Fisher Bros. Sales, Inc., 46 F.3d at 290.
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"'once the government makes a policy decision.., it must proceed
with due care in the implementation of that decision." 61 Thus
the testing of the fruit for cyanide had to be conducted with due
care. 'ITIhe removal from the market of cyanide-contaminated
grapes may be discretionary but the proper performance of estab-
lished tests to detect the contamination is not."1 62
The difference in opinion between the majority and dissent
marks the difference among the circuits themselves regarding the
application of the discretionary function exception. The confusion
is over which official's decision is to be tested as discretionary.
The Gaubert majority would place a presumption of discretion in
every official decision, whereas Justice Scalia would look to the
official's position of employment and decide if the decision truly
required discretion or as the third circuit stated "require[d] only
performance of [an objective], scientific evaluation." 63 The social,
economic, and political policy factors that Congress intended to
shield from liability would have no place in the decision-making
process of an official engaged in objective scientific or safety
evaluations.
For example, there is a clear conflict in the Fourth and Sixth
Circuits regarding the decisions of inspectors from the Mine
Safety and Health Administration (MSHA). Both Estate of
Bernaldes v. United States16 4 and Myers v. United States165
involved FTCA claims for mine workers killed in accidents alleged
to have been due to the negligent inspection of the mines.'166 Both
plaintiffs alleged that were it not for the inspectors' negligence,
the accidents would not have occurred.
161. Id. at 291 (quoting Caplan v. United States, 877 F.2d 1314, 1316 (6th Cir.
1989)).
162. Id.
163. Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059, 1066 (3d Cir. 1974).
164. 81 F.3d 428 (4th Cir. 1996).
165. 17 F.3d 890 (6th Cir. 1994).
166. Estate of Bernaldes v. United States, 81 F.3d 428 (4th Cir. 1996), involved
a worker who was killed in a fall at a mine. The Estate claimed the MSHA
inspectors negligently failed to discover safety violations including inadequate
lighting and the lack of a grate, railing, or safety harness in the coal shed, which
caused Mr. Bernaldes' fatal fall.
Myers v. United States, 17 F.3d 890 (6th Cir. 1994), involved an explosion
that killed several miners. The survivors alleged several mandatory non-
discretionary duties on the part of MSHA inspectors, and their disregard for
these duties caused the conditions amenable for the explosion to occur.
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In Bernaldes, the Fourth Circuit employed the two-prong
Berkovitz/Gaubert test set forth by the Supreme Court to find
that "although the MSHA regulations contain some mandatory
language, mining inspectors have the discretion under the regula-
tions to determine if a given mine is in compliance with the regu-
lations."'67 The court cited Gaubert for the proposition that the
"MSHA regulations were not sufficiently specific to be considered
'mandatory.' 16 However, Gaubert specifically states "[tihe focus
of the inquiry is not on the agent's subjective intent in exercising
the discretion conferred by statute or regulation, but on the nature
of the actions taken and on whether they are susceptible to policy
analysis."169
The Bernaldes court did not consider the nature of the MSHA
inspectors' actions, rather it was assumed, under Gaubert, that if
the government employee has discretion, any decision would be
"grounded in policy when exercising that discretion." 70 Thus, the
court failed to consider, under the first-prong of the Berkovitz test,
whether the MSHA inspector, in fact, had discretion. Then, sim-
ply because the MSHA inspector made a decision (an arguably
unauthorized one), the court reasoned that the decision was pre-
sumptively grounded in public policy. Obviously the lower courts'
interpretation of Gaubert is too broad. In this case, it appears the
Fourth Circuit used Gaubert as a amnesty from making difficult
determinations.
Accordingly the Bernaldes court found "that the Sixth Circuit
erred in Myers v. United States . . . when it held the questions of
safety involved objective non-policy based factors."' 7 ' However,
the Myers court correctly read Gaubert to find the discretionary
function exception did not apply.' 72 Upon an examination of the
nature of the MSHA inspectors' actions, the Myers court reasoned
the inspectors did have a discretionary choice in making safety
determinations, however those decisions were not based upon
public policy but on objective considerations of safety. 173 The
167. Bernaldes, 81 F.3d at 429.
168. Id. at 429. (citing Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325; this part of the opinion in
Gaubert concentrates on extinguishing the distinction between operational and
planning levels and their function in discretionary function analysis, not on the
definition of "mandatory.").
169. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325 (emphasis added).
170. Bernaldes, 81 F.3d at 429 (citing Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 324).
171. Bernaldes, 81 F.3d at 429.
172. Myers, 17 F.3d at 890.
173. Id. at 896-898.
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court correctly examined the MSHA regulations carefully to
decide whether the actions of the inspectors were mandatory and
non-discretionary. 74
Based upon the language of the MSHA regulations, the court
decided the nature of the inspectors' actions necessitated a choice
"sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the Berkovitz /Gaubert anal-
ysis."175 Then, "[h]aving determined [the] ... duties .. .require
decisions or choices by the MSHA inspectors.., it remains only to
be determined whether these choices or decisions are 'grounded in
the social, economic or political goals of the statute and regula-
tions.'" 7 6 The court reiterated the Gaubert presumption in favor
of finding a policy-based decision, but nevertheless recognized "in
many cases, the presumption would be rebutted because many
acts performed by agency personnel-though they involve a signif-
icant degree of choice-are not grounded in regulatory policy and
thus are not protected by the discretionary function exception. " 177
The court reasoned that although a choice was made and it was in
furtherance of the MSHA regulation, it was not necessarily based
upon the policy considerations that underlie the regulation itself.
The court rightly focused on the inquiry of the nature of the par-
ticular official's conduct.
The determination of whether the conduct in a particular case
sufficiently rebuts this presumption, "the inquiry must focus on an
objective evaluation of the discretion conferred rather than a
review of the actor's subjective method of choosing a course of
action."178 Not all discretion is based on policy considerations.
Like the Fourth Circuit in Bernaldes, courts are using the
Gaubert presumption too broadly and inferring policy considera-
tions where none exist. The Myers court also agreed with Justice
Scalia's concurring opinion in Gaubert.
[Tihe status of the actor is not totally irrelevant ... the higher
the actor stands in a particular agency, the stronger the presump-
tion that he is afforded discretion to devise public policy. Con-
versely, the lower the status of the actor, the less likely it is that
174. Id. at 895.
175. Id. at 896.
176. Id. (quoting Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 323).
177. Id. (citing Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325-26 n.7 for the proposition of rebuttal
of the presumption in favor of policy-based decisions).
178. Id. (citing Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325-326).
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he is authorized to set policy and the more likely he is to be merely
implementing the policy choices of others.
179
The Myers court went on to find the MSHA inspectors were
not authorized to set policy, they merely made objective choices
regarding neutral principles of safety.180 The argument that the
inspectors exercised policy judgment "relie[d] too heavily on the
presumption in Gaubert and fail[ed] to demonstrate ... any con-
sideration of 'political, social, or economic policy.'"' 1" Therefore,
the Sixth Circuit did not apply the discretionary function excep-
tion due to the lack of policy concerns in the challenged actions. 182
The Fifth Circuit has also recognized the Gaubert presump-
tion to be rebuttable, however in Baldassaro v. United States, the
court laid down an almost insurmountable standard.18 3  In
Baldassaro, a seaman was injured aboard a governmental vessel
when part of a detachable sea rail separated from his bunk, caus-
ing him to fall to the deck.184 He filed suit against the United
States pursuant to the War Shipping Administration Act
(WSAA)' 85 and the Suits in Admiralty Act (SAA).'1 6 "Although
the SAA does not contain an express discretionary function excep-
tion to its waiver of sovereign immunity,"18 7 the discretionary
function exception of the FTCA is "implicit in private suits
brought against the United States government under the Suits in
Admiralty Act." s'
The court began its analysis with the Berkovitz/Gaubert two-
prong test. It correctly inquired as to the nature of the decision to
use detachable sea rails rather than the permanent sea rails rec-
ommended by the Maritime Administration (MARAD).'8 9 There
179. Id. at 896 n.6 (citing Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 334-38 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
180. Id. at 896-97.
181. Id. at 897.
182. Id. Although the court did not apply the discretionary function exception,
it dismissed the action nonetheless because there was no analogous Tennessee
law that provided a basis for finding that a private individual under like
circumstances would owe a duty of care to the miners or their survivors, and the
FTCA did not create a private cause of action for the government's breach of the
regulatory scheme. Id. at 904-05.
183. Baldassaro v. United States, 64 F.3d 206 (5th Cir. 1995).
184. Id. at 207.
185. 50 U.S.C. app. § 1291 (1981).
186. 46 U.S.C. app. § 741-52 (1987).
187. Baldassara, 64 F.3d at 208.
188. Id. (citing Wiggins v. United States Through Dep't of Army, 799 F.2d 962,
966 (5th Cir. 1986)).
189. Id. at 209.
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was no evidence presented that the MARAD standards required
sea rails to be attached permanently and thus the court found "the
design for the bunks on board the vessel was a discretionary act
for purposes" of the first prong of the Berkovitz /Gaubert test.190
For the second prong, the court stated the appropriate inquiry
to be "whether the act in question is 'susceptible to policy analy-
sis'" but followed with the Gaubert presumption. 191 Mr. Baldas-
saro argued that "policy considerations such as expense,
appearance, safety, comfort, practicability and function are not
social, economic, or political considerations of a governmental
nature." 92 The decision between detachable and permanent sea
rails contained no policy consideration that Congress meant to
protect by the discretionary function exception. Like the Sixth
Circuit case in Myers, the decision here was based on objective
factors of safety, comfort, appearance, and expense. The Fifth Cir-
cuit rejected that proposition in favor of an insurmountable
Gaubert presumption. The court stated the overbroad proposition
" that almost any exercise of governmental discretion could be
overly parsed so as to focus on minute details of sub-decisions to
he point that any relationship to policy would appear too
attenuated."193
So if a plaintiff is to overcome the presumption they must look
to the specific decision that caused the harm, and it is the underly-
ing consideration of that challenged decision that should be ana-
lyzed. The Fifth Circuit was satisfied that as long as a policy-
based discretionary judgement was made at some point in time,
the discretionary function exception would blanket all subsequent
decisions. Like the Third Circuit in Fisher Bros. Sales, Inc., 194 the
court focused its analysis on the wrong discretionary judgment.
Here, the challenge was against the decision to use detachable
hand rails, not on the broad decision to accept that particular ves-
sel for the Ready Reserve Force component of the National
Defense Reserve Fleet.1 95
Mr. Baldassaro raised another important issue in making his
claim. He claimed the decisions made by the manufacturer were
190. Id.
191. Id. at 211 (quoting Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 325).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. 46 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 1995).
195. Id. at 210.
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not of a governmental nature. 196 This claim related to another
problem with the current application of the discretionary function
exception-it applies to many decisions that are not governmental
decisions. 19
7
The Court in Dalehite, when reviewing the legislative history
of the FTCA, found that
while Congress desired to waive the Government's immunity
form actions for injuries to person and property occasioned by the
tortious conduct of its agents acting within their scope of business,
it was not contemplated that the Government should be subject to
liability arising from acts of a governmental nature for function. 98
The House Report of the Congress that adopted the discre-
tionary function exception stated it to be
a highly important exception, intended to preclude any possi-
bility that the bill might be construed to authorize suit for dam-
ages against the Government growing out of authorized activity,
such as flood control or irrigation project, where no negligence on
the part of any government agent is shown, and the only ground
for the suit is the contention that the same conduct by a private
individual would be tortious. 99
As the Dalehite Court correctly interpreted "[one only need
read s 2680 in its entirety to conclude that Congress exercised
care to protect the Government from claims, however negligently
caused, that affected the governmental functions."20 ' Thus, the
discretionary function exception was intended to shield the Gov-
ernment form liability for acts conducted in furtherance of its
uniquely governmental functions. When the United States, or its
agents, is not acting in a core governmental role, it should not be
able to assert the discretionary function exception. A better
approach to the discretionary function exception would involve a
three-prong inquiry: 1) does the challenged action involve a
196. Id. at 211.
197. See Indian Towing Co., 350 U.S. at 66-68; Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 815,
n.12; Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 531.
198. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 27-28 (emphasis added). See H.R. Rep. No. 2800,
71st Cong., 1st Sess. 13; Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. 28, 33, 38, 45, 65-66; S. Rep. No. 1196, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 7; H.R. Rep. No.
1287, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 5. 86 Cong. Rec. 12021-12022.
199. See H.R. Rep. No. 2245, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 10; S. Rep. No. 1196, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7; H.R. Rep. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6; Hearings before
H.Com. on Judiciary on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 33.
(emphasis added).
200. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 32 (emphasis added).
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uniquely governmental function, (2) does the challenged action
involve discretion, and (3) is the challenged action grounded in the
policy considerations Congress intended to immunize from judicial
second-guessing.2 01
The Court has expressly rejected this approach regarding a
unique government function.20 2 However, in each of these
instances the Court rejected the argument when the Government
attempted to use the idea of a "unique" or "core governmental
function" as a offensive blanket avoidance of liability. In each
case, the United States attempted to escape liability by claiming
their actions were uniquely governmental. The Court responded
to this aggressive argument by resounding "all Government activ-
ity is inescapably 'uniquely governmental' in that it is performed
by the Government."2 °3 In spite of these arguments, the threshold
determination of whether the challenged action is uniquely gov-
ernmental is necessary for the effective application of the discre-
tionary function exception. Not all Government activity is
uniquely governmental.
For example, in Jurzec v. American Motors Corp., the plaintiff
sued the government after her husband died as a result of the rol-
lover of a surplus jeep he had purchased from the Postal Ser-
204vice. She asserted that the discretionary function exception did
not apply because she was suing the Postal Service in the Ser-
vice's capacity as a seller of jeeps, "a traditionally non-governmen-
tal role," rather than in its capacity as a regulator.20 5 The court
rejected the distinction between governmental and non-govern-
mental operations based on the Supreme Court precedent.20 6
In Jurzec, the Government did not attempt to use the discre-
tionary function defense as an aggressive shield. Rather, Mrs.
Jurzec asserted that because the Government did not act in a
uniquely governmental role, it could not have made determina-
tions based on social, economic, or political considerations when it
sold her husband a defective jeep. It is only logical that such a
201. The second and third prongs are the Berkovitz/Gaubert test. These
prongs should be analyzed with due regard for the position of the employee who
made the discretionary decision, adhering to Justice Scalia's concurrence in
Gaubert.
202. See Indian Towing Co., 350 U.S. at 66-68; Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 815,
n.12; Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 531.
203. Indian Towing Co., 350 U.S. at 67.
204. Jurzec v. American Motors Corp., 856 F.2d 1116 (8th Cir. 1988).
205. Id. at 1118.
206. Id. at 1118.
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determination is made of the nature of the particular conduct
involved in order to further Congress' intent to protect against
judicial second-guessing of policy determinations. There must be
a underlying policy determination. If the Government is not act-
ing in its role as a regulator, it will not be making policy determi-
nations, consequently the judiciary would have nothing upon
which to make a second guess.
In Rothrock v. United States207 , the Seventh Circuit found the
discretionary function exception applied where the Government
was acting in its unique governmental role as regulator of the
highways. 20 Here, a motorist sued the United States seeking to
recover for personal injuries he sustained in an accident allegedly
caused by the absence of a guardrail on a bridge that was resur-
faced with federal funds.20 9 Rothrock claims that under the
FTCA, that the United States was liable because it failed to
"ensure, as a condition of its funding decision, that the bridge was
constructed in accordance with the safety standards it references
for such decisions, including those adopted by the American Asso-
ciation of State Highway Traffic Officials."2 1 °
The court began its discussion with the BerkovitzlGaubert
test. The court found the applicable statute, the Federal Aid
Highway Act,211 directs the Secretary of Transportation to formu-
late guidelines for the approval of projects "in the best overall pub-
lic interest."212 The statute lists a number of factors the Secretary
is to consider when approving projects21 3 and the court found "the
sheer number of factors involved suggests that Congress intended
these decisions to be made as an exercise of judgment and
choice."21 4 Projects were to be approved based upon a totality of
circumstances approach, involving both objective and subjective
evaluations. The court reasoned "the statutes and regulations
207. 62 F.3d 196 (7th Cir. 1995).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 197.
210. Id.
211. 23 U.S.C. §§101-58 (1996).
212. Rothrock, 62 F.3d at 199 (quoting 23 U.S.C. § 109(h)).
213. The court listed 5 factors in 23 U.S.C. §109(h): (1) air, noise, and water
pollution; (2) destruction or disruption of man-made and natural resources,
aesthetic values, community cohesion and the availability of public facilities and
services; (3) adverse employment effects, and tax and property value losses; (4)
injurious displacement of people, businesses and farms; and (5) disruption of
desirable community and regional growth.
214. Id.
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themselves satisfy the first requirement for the discretionary
function exception." 2
15
In its discussion of the second prong, the court began with
the Gaubert presumption. However, it analyzed the government's
decision on allocating federal funds. The court stated "[elven
without Gaubert's presumption, this decision is explicitly subject
to policy analysis under the statute and regulations."216 The court
went on to state the United States had a primary responsibility
for maintenance of the road, and its decision on how to allocate
funds in furtherance of that goal clearly involves the type of social,
economic and political considerations the discretionary function
exception is designed to shield.2 17 By way of example, the alloca-
tion of federal funds is a core governmental function that the dis-
cretionary function should protect.
In the Eighth Circuit, although the court rejected the unique
governmental function distinction in Jurzec, two subsequent deci-
sions use language that is consistent with making such a thresh-
old determination of whether a particular act or decision involved
a unique governmental function. InAppley Bros. v. United States,
farmers and grain elevators, who sold or stored grain at federally
licensed grain warehouses, alleged negligent failure to follow spe-
cific agency regulations in inspecting the warehouses. 2 18  The
plaintiffs argued that although the decision of the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) to suspend a warehouse's
license would be a discretionary function, the fact that agency pol-
icy required the inspectors to verify compliance with the regula-
tions was not a decision grounded in social, economic, and political
policy.2 19 "Indeed, the failure was not one of policy choice; rather,
it was 'a failure to effectuate policy choices already made.'" 220 The
policy choice by the USDA was a core governmental function, but
the inspector's choice to overlook the violations of that policy was
not an action of an employee exercising a unique governmental
function. The inspector's duties were objective obligations, the
negligent performance of which would cause the government to be
215. Id.
216. Id. at 200.
217. Id.
218. Appley Bros. v. United State% 7 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 1993).
219. Id. at 727.
220. Id. (quoting Camozzi v. Roland/Miller & Hope Consulting Group, 866 F.2d
287, 290 (9th Cir. 1989)). See Dube v. Pittsburgh Coming, 870 F.2d 790, 799 (1st
Cir. 1989); Prescott v. United States, 959 F.2d 793, 799 (9th Cir. 1992); Collins v.
United States, 783 F.2d 1225, 1229 (5th Cir. 1986).
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liable as a private citizen in like circumstances under the
FTCA.22 '
In Tonelli v. United States, postal patrons sued under the
FTCA alleging that postal workers stole their mail from their post
office box. 222 When the patrons noticed mail "of an adult nature"
had been opened and resealed, they reported the problem to a pos-
tal employee who, in turn, reported the problem to the postmas-
ter.22 s The postmaster, after an unmistakable delay, initiated a
post office "sting" in which "the postal inspectors observed a postal
employee . . . removing first class mail from the Tonelli's post
office box, opening some of the mail and removing some of the pic-
tures."22 4 The complaint alleged negligent hiring, negligent
supervision, and retention of that particular postal worker.The court, using the Berkovitz/Gaubert test, analyzed the
claims discretely.225 With respect to the issues of negligent super-
vision and retention, the court stated "[i]ssues . . .generally
involve the permissible exercise of policy judgment and fall within
the discretionary function exception . . . [hiowever this action
involves allegations that the post office failed to act when it had
notice of illegal behavior."2 26 Thus, the "failure to act after notice
... [would] not represent a choice based on plausible policy consid-
erations."227 With respect to the alleged negligent hiring, "[t]he
post office's choice between several potential employees involves
the weighing of individual backgrounds, office diversity, experi-
ence, and employer intuition."2 8
For the court to analyze a claim like the claim raised in
Tonelli, would require "judicial second-guessing" of the Govern-
ment's decision to hire a particular employee. 229 However, an
analysis of a claim for failure to act upon receiving notice of illegal
acts of an employee, like the one in Tonelli, removes the Govern-
ment from its core governmental function. This removal should
allow the Government to be sued as a private individual under
like circumstances. The government's actions within a unique
221. See Indian Towing Co., 350 U.S. 66-68.
222. Tonelli v. United States, 60 F.3d 492 (8th Cir. 1995).
223. Id. at 494.
224. Id. The postal worker who pilfered the pictures resigned in lieu of
termination about two weeks later.
225. Id. at 496.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
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governmental function are closely tied to the necessity for a policy-
based discretionary decision, but the two should remain distinct
factors for invoking the discretionary function exception.
The Ninth Circuit contains a plethora of discretionary func-
tion litigation. A cursory review of the more recent cases helps to
define the term "unique governmental function." The introductory
paragraph of this paper concerned Childers v. United States, the
case involving a tragic hiking accident which resulted in the death
of an 11-year old boy.230 The court found a discretionary function
in the Government's decision regarding the maintenance and
treatment of trails in Yellowstone National Park.231 Like the allo-
cation of funds for road and highway maintenance, the allocation
of federal funds for trail maintenance is a unique governmental
function.
A closely analogous case shows that a uniquely governmental
function is one that involves a matter of regulatory choice or judg-
ment.23 2 In Faber v. United States, a diver sued the United States
for its failure to warn of the existence of diving hazards in a
national park.23 3 The court held "the use of the discretionary
function exception must be limited to those unusual situations
where the government was required to engage in broad, policy-
making activities or to consider unique social, economic, and polit-
ical circumstances in the course of making judgments."234 The
court recognized that not every decision by the Government is a
uniquely governmental decision. In this case, there was not a
unique governmental function because the challenged conduct
was the same as that of a private citizen who fails to take proper
action to ensure the safety of visitors on its property and is
thereby liable for negligence.235
Faber can be reconciled with Childers. In Childers, the
National Park Service had to make broad decisions regarding aes-
thetic values and environmental coherence, while in Faber, the
employees of the United States Forest Service failed to follow spe-
cifically prescribed federal policy to warn of the danger of diving.
The underlying policy decision of the development of a sign plan to
230. Childers, 40 F.3d at 973. See the earlier discussion in the introductory
paragraph of this paper.
231. Id. at 974.
232. Faber v. United States, 56 F.3d 1122, 1124 (9th Cir. 1995).
233. Id. at 1123.
234. Id. at 1125 (emphasis added).
235. Id.
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warn was a unique governmental function, but when the employ-
ees failed to follow specific guidelines in Faber, the first prong of
the Berkovitz /Gaubert test was not met and thus the discretion-
ary function exception did not apply to bar the diver's claim.236
Another example of a unique governmental function is the
conduct of military investigators. Three different cases found a
discretionary function existed while agents of the military per-
formed investigations of alleged foul play,237 the negligent
destruction of civilian aircraft on a military base,238 and the negli-
gent maintenance of a river.23 9
In Sabow v. United States, the unique governmental function
was the investigation by the Naval Investigative Service (NIS)
and the Office of the Judge Advocate General (JAG) regarding the
death of a Marine Corps officer from a gunshot wound while under
investigation for alleged misuse of military aircraft. 24 ° The deci-
sions by the NIS and the JAG are both grounded in unique consid-
erations with social, economic, and political components.241 Thus,
to escape the discretionary function exception bar, the Sabows
needed to point to specific failures in following directives and show
an investigator's decision was merely based on objective factors.
Since they could not, the unique governmental function of military
investigation met the two-pronged Berkovitz /Gaubert test and the
suit was barred by the discretionary function exception.
In Black Hills Aviation, Inc. v. United States, the unique gov-
ernmental function was the Army's decision regarding the scope of
its investigation.2 42 The United States Army White Sands Missile
Range is a highly controlled and secured military installation.
The Army and the Department of Defense conducted a series of
236. Id. at 1127. See Valdez v. United States, 56 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 1995)
(Hiker brought negligence claim for injuries he sustained when he fell down the
face of a waterfall in a national park, court held the discretionary function
exception did bar the hiker's claim because the determinations made by the NPS
involved the same unique government functions as in Childers.). Blackburn v.
United States, 100 F.3d 1426 (9th Cir. 1996) (Diver sought to recover for injuries
he suffered when he dove off a bridge due to the failure to warn and the negligent
design and maintenance of the bridge itself but was barred by the discretionary
function exception.).
237. Sabow v. United States, 93 F.3d 1445 (9th Cir. 1996)
238. Black Hills Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 34 F.3d 968 (10th Cir. 1994).
239. Tew v. United States, 86 F.3d 1003 (10th Cir. 1996).
240. Sabow, 93 F.3d at 1449-50.
241. Id. at 1453-54.
242. Black Hills Aviation, Inc., 34 F.3d at 970.
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ground-to-air missile tests and contracted with Black Hills Avia-
tion, a privately owned civilian aviation company, for aerial fire
suppression services in connection with these tests.243 During the
ffight, the Black Hills aircraft crashed on the missile range and
both civilian pilots were killed.2 "
The father of one of the pilots and the owner of the aircraft
"requested access to the crash cite and was allowed the following:
(1) an overflight of the crash site ... ; (2) a visit to the crash
cite.., with.., the Public Affairs Officer at the missile range... ;
(3) a visit to the crash cite.., to disassemble the landing gear... ;
and (4) a visit to the crash cite area to pick up the wreckage that
had been airlifted to a range road."245
Neither the National Transportation Safety Board nor the
Army Safety Center in Fort Rucker actually investigated the
crash.24 6 The Army did not allow the plaintiff "to perform [his]
own investigation of the undisturbed crash cite or participate in
the Army's investigation."247 The plaintiff personally retained a
team of "experts to conduct an analysis of the... debris," and they
"found some evidence that an external force had affected [the
ffight before the] crash."248 The plaintiff believed the Army mis-
takenly shot down his son's flight and sued the Government for
his son's wrongful death and the negligent destruction of the
aircraft. 249
The court phrased the issue as "whether the discretion...
[not to investigate] ... is the kind that the discretionary function
was designed to shield."250 The court held "the decisions made by
the officers on the White Sands Missile Base concerning the . . .
investigation of the crash. .. involved a trade-off between a more
complete investigation into the cause of the crash and the resump-
tion of important military missile tests."251 Military officers' deci-
sions involved the unique function of government as protector and
defender of the nation. As a unique government function, the
decisions are then amenable to the Berkovitz / Gaubert test to com-
plete the determination of whether those decisions are discretion-
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 971.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 971-72.
249. Id. at 971.
250. Id., at 976. (quoting Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537).
251. Id.
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ary functions. Since the decisions were not made in violation of
regulation and since they were "obviously decisions grounded in
military policy which are not to be second-guessed by the courts,"
the court barred the claim through the discretionary function
exception. 52
In Tew v. United States, a man was killed while rafting when
his raft capsized after passing an underwater structure.2 53 His
mother brought a wrongful death suit alleging the Department of
the Army Corps of Engineers was aware of the structure, but
neither it nor the United States Coast Guard had placed any
warning signs or markers on the river.254
The court fashioned the issue as "whether these alleged gov-
ernmental duties fulfill the two requirements of the discretionary
function exception."255 By so phrasing the issue, the Tenth Circuit
regarded the duties of the Department of the Army Corps of Engi-
neers and the United States Coast Guard as being uniquely gov-
ernmental. The court went on to find the Corps had absolutely no
duty to mark such structures and dismissed the claim. 2 6 The
Coast Guard's "power to mark obstructions ... clearly involves an
element of judgment or choice."257 Further, the Coast Guard's
decision to leave the structure unmarked was grounded in eco-
nomic and practicability policy decisions. 258 Thus, along with
Sabow and Black Hills, Tew shows clearly that considerations
involving the function of the military are unique governmental
functions.
Another analogous area of discretionary functions within the
military is characterized by Crumpton v. Stone,2 59 where the wife
of an Army officer who committed suicide brought an action based
on the release of investigatory records relating to the officer. 60
The release of the records allegedly caused the officer's wife great
embarrassment and emotional distress.261 The court quickly dis-
missed the action due to the Army's unique role and "the discre-
tion exercised by the Army in evaluating the [Freedom of
252. Id.
253. Tew, 86 F.3d 1003.
254. Id. at 1004.
255. Id. at 1005.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1006
258. Id.
259. Crumpton v. Stone, 59 F.3d 1400 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
260. Id.
261. Id. at 1402.
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Information Act] request [was] of the nature and quality that Con-
gress intended to shield from tort liability."262 The court stated
such decisions by military officials to be "quintessential discretion-
ary function[s]." 263 By example, therefore, it is apparent that any
military agency decision involves a unique governmental function.
One additional problem with the current application of the
discretionary function exception is characterized by the Eleventh
Circuit in Powers v. United States.264 Under the current opera-
tion, courts have refashioned the Berkovitz/Gaubert test to make
it even more broadly applicable than it was before. In Powers, the
plaintiffs were property owners who sued the United States for
uninsured flood losses, "alleging that the Government had negli-
gently failed to publicize the availability of federally subsidized
flood insurance."265 Although the court did not discuss it, the sub-
sidizing of flood insurance would clearly be a unique governmental
function. The court found the discretionary function exception
protected the decision not to publicize the flood insurance.266 In
reaching that conclusion, the court relied on a refashioned model
of the Berkovitz /Gaubert test, stated in the converse: "if a govern-
ment official in performing his statutory duties must act without
reliance upon a fixed or readily ascertainable standard, the deci-
sion he makes is discretionary and within the discretionary func-
tion exception."267 Although this test tries merely to state the
converse of the first prong of the Berkovitz / Gaubert test, it modi-
fies the test to allow more discretionary function exceptions. By
stating the test in this way, the court is able to add more equivocal
words than are necessary to determine if the challenged action
involved a matter of choice. 268
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the refurbishing of opinions handed down by the
Supreme Court is unavoidable, it only enlarges the application of
the discretionary function exception. Congress did not intend the
262. Id. (quoting Cope v. Scott, 45 F. 3d 445, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
263. Id. at 1406.
264. Powers v. United States, 996 F.2d 1121 (11th Cir. 1993).
265. Id. at 1122.
266. Id. at 1123.
267. Id. at 1124 (emphasis added) (quoting Alabama Elec. Coop., Inc. v.
United States, 769 F.2d 1523, 1529 (11th Cir. 1985)).
268. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536 ("whether the action is a matter of choice for
the acting employee").
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exception to swallow the rule. The discretionary function excep-
tion is applied too often and with varying results. If a court is
confused by the current test, it will make a decision on an ad hoc
basis, quoting only the most ambiguous and ambivalent language
from Berkovitz and Gaubert. If a court understands the purpose
of the discretionary function exception, it still has years of case
law precedent with which to reach the answer it wants based on
the particular facts in the case before it at the time.
If the Supreme Court should revisit the discretionary function
exception, given the state of confusion and disorientation in the
lower federal courts, it should restore Congress' true intent to
make the federal government liable for its tortious actions as a
private citizen in like circumstances, unless the employee is acting
under a unique governmental function, makes a discretionary
choice, and uses a policy-based judgment in making that decision.
Then, and only then, should the decision be guarded by the discre-
tionary function exception.
The determination of whether a challenged action is a unique
governmental function is does not have a bright line answer.
However the question is not amorphous. It requires a court to
consider whether the social, economic, and political factors under-
lying the challenged conduct-those that involve the kinds of deci-
sions Congress intended to shield-are in furtherance of a core
governmental regulatory purpose. Therefore, when the employee
is dedicated to a governmental function, his decisions may be
shielded by the discretionary function exception. On the other
hand, if that employee is not functioning in furtherance of a core
governmental purpose, his decision should not be shielded by the
discretionary function exception because Congress did not intend
such decisions to be immunized.
V. AN IMPROVED TEST
To begin, a threshold determination must be made as to
whether the discretionary choice involves a uniquely governmen-
tal function. If not, the discretionary function exception is not
applicable. If the choice involves a unique governmental function,
a court must consider whether the action is a matter of choice for
the acting employee.269 If not, if the employee was under a
mandatory directive to follow a specific course of action, the dis-
269. See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536; Gaubert 499 U.S. at 327. This is the first
prong of the Berkovitz / Gaubert test.
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cretionary function exception is not applicable. If the challenged
conduct involves an element of judgment, a court must determine
whether that decision was based on considerations of public pol-
icy. 2 70 In making the Berkovitz/Gaubert two-prong inquiry, a
court should take the level of the decision maker into account
based on his/her responsibility for making a relevant policy judg-
ment and that the subject matter of the decision is one that ought
to be informed by policy considerations. 271
This test would sufficiently immunize the type of conduct
Congress intended to shield when it fashioned the discretionary
function exception while narrowing the applicability it as a blan-
ket exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity. Although the
Supreme Court has expressly rejected some of the contentions of
this new test, upon reconsideration it may realize the overbreadth
of the current test and the need to simplify and succinctly charac-
terize the discretionary function exception.
Amy M. Hackman
270. See Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 536-37; Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 332. This is the
second prong of the Berkovitz/Gaubert test.
271. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (Scalia, J., concurring). This is the gist of Justice
Scalia's concurrence in Gaubert-that the operational/planning level distinction
should not be determinative of a discretionary function, but that the
decisionmaker's level of employment is relevant to both prongs of the Berkovitz /
Gaubert test.
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